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Discussions of “American Empire” and the “Pax Americana” 
can be found in nearly every corner of the political spectrum. 
Arguments about the putative American imperium appear regularly 
on opinion-editorial pages of major papers across the globe and 
in foreign-policy journals. International-relations scholars 
have not had a lot to say about this debate, and very little has 
been published on it in scholarly international-relations 
journals. This is unfortunate, because the current debate 
suffers from two major flaws. 
First, most scholars, pundits, and analysts who address the 
issue offer little more than warmed-over variants of logics 
found in structural realism, hegemonic-stability theory, and 
other mainline realist accounts of the dynamics of systems with 
a single, preeminent power. The term “empire” is superfluous to 
rather conventional claims about the desirability of 
unilateralism or multilateralism, the risks of overextension, 
and what policies are likely to trigger balancing behavior. 
Second, analysts tend to focus on lessons drawn from the 
foreign policy of historical empires. These have some relevance 
to the grand strategy of a putative American. Yet if there is an 
American imperium, it is, by and large, an informal one. 
American “imperial relations” are not with colonies or 
incorporated territories, but with other sovereign states. Thus, 
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the locus of analysis should not be the interstate interactions 
of empires, but their “domestic” relations with constituent 
peripheries.1 
These flaws have major implications for mainline 
international-relations scholarship on systems with preeminent 
powers. Work on the specific properties of imperial systems has 
lagged far behind analysis of unipolar and hegemonic orders. We 
lack theories of the dynamics of empires that adequately 
distinguishes them from those associated with unipolarity and 
hegemony. At the same time, mainstream analysis of great-power 
grand strategy tends to conceptualize international structure in 
general, and anarchy in particular, as standing outside of the 
kinds of entities that populate it and the ways in which they 
relate to one another. This leads us to treat the question of 
American empire as one of unit type, when what is really at 
stake is whether the structure of the current international 
system has characteristics associated with imperial orders. 
                                                 
1 For examples, see Alterman 2003; Bellah 2002; Bender 2003; 
Ignatieff 2003; Kagan 1998; Zakaria 1999. For a good overview, 
see Cox 2004. There are prominent exceptions, in whole or in 
part, to the tendencies we identify, such as Barnett and Duvall 
2005; Kaplan 2003; Mann 2003; Rosen 2003. 
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To address these problems, we argue that international 
structure should be conceptualized in network and relational 
terms: as regularities in patterns of transaction between 
various actors and social sites. Ideal-typical empires can be 
represented as a particular kind of network generated by two 
specific elements: heterogeneous contracting and rule through 
local intermediaries. In empires, cross-cutting ties between 
peripheries are sparse, local intermediaries operate as brokers 
between local interests and central authorities, and the 
imperial core occupies a high degree of centrality with respect 
to the rest of the network. 
Through a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning, 
we generate a number of key structural dynamics of such a 
network. It both facilitates and places a premium on divide-and-
rule strategies, but it also produces strong cross pressures on 
core imperial authorities as they attempt to navigate the 
competing demands of different peripheries. Indirect rule, for 
its part, minimizes governance costs and allows core imperial 
authorities to blame intermediaries for unpopular policies. On 
the other hand, it creates endemic principal-agent problems 
that, at the extreme, can lead intermediaries to rebel against 
imperial rule. 
There are two main advantages to casting the structure of 
empires in network terms. First, doing so allows us to compare 
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the structural properties of empires directly to those 
associated with ideal-typical unipolar and hegemonic systems. 
Second, a network approach to international structure highlights 
how variation in patterns of transaction in the international 
politics can lead to distinctive embedded structural logics 
within the same international system. 
We begin with an overview of approaches to systems with 
preeminent powers. After a quick discussion of mainstream 
accounts – unipolarity and hegemony – we lay out our argument 
about the dynamics of empires. In the next section, we introduce 
principles from network analysis that inform our deductive 
account of imperial processes and provide a basis for 
endogenizing structural variation between international systems 
characterized by single-power primacy. We then recast unipolar, 
hegemonic, and imperial orders in terms of their network 
structures before moving onto a detailed discussion of how 
structural tendencies and strategies of control interact in 
imperial systems to shape their persistence and decline.  Here 
we use a number of illustrations designed to show how similar 
processes can be observed, and configure differently, across 
disparate imperial systems.2 We subsequently suggest how various 
                                                 
2 This article is not intended to provide a rigorous test of 
hypothesis derived from imperial structures, but to establish 
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configurations of the network properties of international 
politics are likely to trigger different dynamics associated 
with unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial orders. In the 
conclusion, we reflect on some implications for the question of 
“American Empire.” 
 
Three Approaches to Systems with Preeminent 
Powers  
Mainstream approaches to systems with single, predominant 
powers fall into one of two frameworks.3 The first, unipolarity, 
assumes that states are unitary actors operating within an 
anarchical environment. Some argue that unipolar systems are 
inherently unstable: the concentration of power in the hands of 
a single political community will invariably trigger 
counterbalancing behavior. Others believe that unipolar systems 
                                                                                                                                                             
the plausibility of recurrent mechanisms and processes 
associated with an ideal type. On the advantages and drawbacks 
of this kind of approach, see McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; 
Mommsen 1989, 125-126; Ringer 1997, 5-6, 17, 110-116; Tilly 
1997. 
3 Ikenberry 2002, 8-10. In practice, scholars often draw upon 
elements of both frameworks. 
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are stable precisely because they are unbalanced: no state or 
coalition of states will be able to challenge the preeminent 
power, and hence few are likely to be even attempt to engage in 
balancing behavior.4 
The second, hegemonic-order theory, covers a broader array 
of approaches, including hegemonic-stability theory,5 power-
transition theory,6 and constitutional-order theory (a 
distinctive subtype of hegemonic order).7 The fate of hegemonic 
systems depends largely on the interaction of three factors: the 
ability of the hegemon to sustain its economic, military, and 
technological leadership, the degree to which potential 
challengers perceive themselves as benefiting from the existing 
hegemonic order, and the propensity for hegemonic overextension.8 
Hegemonic-order theorists tend to treat states as unitary 
                                                 
4 Brooks and Wohlforth 2002; Layne 1993; Layne 1997; Waltz 2000; 
Wohlforth 1999. 
5 E.g.,Gilpin 1981; Kindleberger 1973. 
6 E.g., Organski 1958. 
7 E.g., Ikenberry 2001. 
8 E.g., Gilpin 1981, 26-27; Ikenberry 2001. 
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actors, although their vision of hegemonic systems involves 
elements of both anarchy and hierarchy.9 
 
Empires 
The aforementioned accounts generally conceptualize empires 
as a subtype of either unipolarity or hegemony.10 A more robust 
approach recognizes that empires involve distinctive structures 
and dynamics from either unipolar or hegemonic systems. Most 
scholars agree that empires are multiethnic entities, that they 
involve the dominance of one polity over other political 
communities, and that core-periphery relations are an important 
component of imperial systems.11 These features are captured by 
                                                 
9 Power-transition theorists argue that “relations within… [the] 
power hierarchy are not anarchical despite the absence of formal 
rules and enforced laws” Lemke 2002, 22. Ikenberry 2001. 
describes both imperial and constitutional systems as 
“hierarchical.” 
10 Gilpin 1981, 30. Ikenberry 2001, 27. This echoes the tendency 
we have identified in the literature on American empire. 
11 See, for example, Cohen 2004; Doyle 1986; Lake 2001, 133; Mann 
2003; Motyl 1999; Motyl 2001; Rosen 2003, 51; Spruyt 2005, 3-4; 
Tilly 1997; Watson 1992, 16. 
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an ideal type that combines two factors: heterogeneous 
contracting and indirect rule.12 As Charles Tilly argues, cores 
rule their peripheries through the “retention or establishment 
of particular, distinct compacts” and exercise power “through 
intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy within their own 
domains” in exchange for “compliance, tribute, and military 
collaboration with the center.”13 We should examine each of these 
characteristics in turn. 
                                                 
12 We surveyed a number of different historical accounts of 
empires, including the British, Habsburg, Mongol, Muscovite, and 
Roman. We also reviewed what a wide variety of scholars in 
history, sociology, political science, and international affairs 
have to say about the nature of empires. In this respect, our 
account is synthetic. We found widespread agreement on many of 
the fundamental features of empires. Thus, we reduce those 
common features to a few essential characteristics and recast 
those characteristics in terms of an ideal-typical network 
structure. Based on a combination of deductive and inductive 
reasoning, we associate the dynamics outlined above with that 
network structure. On these features more generally, see Howe 
2002, 15, 15. For historical examples, see Allsen 1987; 
Fieldhouse 1966; Koenigsberger 1969; Lenman 2001; Morgan 1990. 
13Tilly 1997, 3, 3. 
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Indirect Rule  
In British imperial historiography, systems of “indirect 
rule” are those in which intermediaries are recruited from 
peripheral populations, such as local chieftains or princes. 
“Direct rule,” in contrast, means administration by officials 
recruited from the imperial core.14 In our usage, both systems 
are variations in indirect rule, i.e., rule through autonomous 
and quasi-autonomous intermediaries.15 
The scope of indirect rule varies across empires. In some, 
local intermediaries are granted very little discretion over a 
wide range of policy formulation and implementation. In others, 
local intermediaries merely have to guarantee a regular flow of 
resources, access to markets, or minimal compliance with general 
imperial rules. During much of the eighteenth century, for 
example, the North American colonies of the British empire were 
essentially self-governing.16 Under the Golden Horde (a typical 
tribute-taking empire), the princes of the former Rus’ could do 
pretty much what they pleased as long as they supplied regular 
tribute (however burdensome) to their imperial rulers, did not 
                                                 
14 Mamdani 1996. 
15 Tilly 1997, 3. 
16 Lenman 2001. 
Nexon/Wright 
11 
unduly interfere with the trade routes that provided a crucial 
source of revenue to the horde, and so forth.17 During the 
northeast expansion of Muscovy, central authorities would often 
issue orders of astounding specificity concerning the movements 
of populations, livestock, and resources. Muscovite agents often 
replaced local elites.18 In Korea, Japanese “governors-general… 
functioned as imperial pro-consuls, rather than as mere agents 
of civil government.” In Taiwan, they were “semi-autonomous and 
highly authoritarian.” Elsewhere, they had far more limited 
autonomy.19 
Informal empires are likely to involve very high levels of 
intermediary autonomy. Just as with many examples of tribute-
taking empires, intermediaries in informal empires are local 
elites who have their own independent power-base among members 
of the local population: local intermediaries may by rulers or 
elected officials in their own right. Nevertheless, as in formal 
empires, the degree of autonomy may vary not only across cases 
but between peripheries within a single empire. 
 
                                                 
17 Halperin 1983, 242 and 250; Martin 1995. 
18 Keenan 1986, 131. 
19 Peattie 1984, 25-26. 
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Heterogeneous Contracting 
 Empires, like all political systems, are based on bargains 
that specify rights and obligations. Imperial bargains may 
involve an exchange of basing rights in the periphery for access 
to markets in the core, or they may specify the adoption of 
specific forms of government or legal orders in a periphery. The 
benefits derived from peripheries may be diffuse, or they may be 
oriented towards a specific elite (colonial or indigenous), 
ethnic group, or sub-region. Such contracts are always 
asymmetric, backed by the threat of imperial force and 
negotiated based on the superior resources of imperial cores, 
but they are contracts nonetheless. To reduce empires to 
coercive arrangements is to miss the degree to which the 
benefits of these contracts, and their ultimate legitimacy, 
underpins imperial orders.20 
Nearly all political communities involve asymmetric 
bargains. Federations, for their part, also involve indirect 
rule. What distinguishes ideal-typical imperial contracting from 
                                                 
20 Cox 2004, 601; Daniels and Kennedy 2002; Lake 1996; Lake 1999; 
Lake 2001; Lendon 1997; Lustick 1993, 447; Pagden 2001; Tilly 
1997. 
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these other examples is that it is heterogeneous: cores develop 
distinctive bargains with each periphery under their control.21 
 
Consequences 
The combination of indirect rule and heterogeneous 
contracting gives ideal-typical empires a specific kind of 
structure, one characterized by low levels of interaction 
between peripheries, and authority relations that run through 
the core. Alexander Motyl calls this structure a “rimless hub-
and-spoke system.” The “most striking aspect of such a structure 
is not the hub and spoke, but the absence of a rim… among the 
peripheral units or between and among them and non-imperial 
polities….”22 
These characteristics shape the dynamics of empires. 
Heterogeneous contracting produces tradeoffs. The more 
heterogeneous imperial bargains, the easier it is, ceteris 
paribus, for central authorities to effectively divide-and-rule 
imperial segments. But highly differentiated imperial bargains 
also increase “cross pressures” on central authorities as they 
are pushed and pulled in different directions by multiple 
                                                 
21 On this distinction between ideal-typical empires and 
federations, see Tilly 1997, 3. 
22 Lendon 1997; Motyl 2001, 16-20, 16-20. 
Nexon/Wright 
14 
constituencies. One common way that imperial rulers minimize 
these problems is through “multivocal signaling”: they attempt 
to legitimize their rule in ways that are coded differently in 
different segments.23 
Similarly, the more empires limit the autonomy of local 
intermediaries, the more they lose the ability to distance 
themselves from unpopular policies while increasing governance 
costs. Expanding the autonomy of local intermediaries, however, 
makes imperial rule less efficient – although it may actually 
prove to be ultimately more effective – while increasing 
principal-agent problems between central authorities and local 
intermediaries; at the extreme, it can facilitate “patrimonial 
secessions” in which the local intermediary attempts to break 
away from imperial control. Such tradeoffs influence, and are 
influenced by, the strategies imperial authorities pursue to 
prevent the formation of countervailing coalitions within 
specific peripheries 
Indeed, imperial structures depend more on divide-and-rule 
strategies than on standard balance-of-power processes; their 
persistence also depends, to a great degree, on  maintaining 
                                                 
23 On “multivocal” or “polyvalent” signaling, see Bakhtin 1990; 
Padgett and Ansell 1993; Tilly 2002. 
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legitimate rule.24 Many of the problems associated with the 
“interstate” relations of empires, such as strategic 
overextension, are just as likely to have their origins in 
internal failures of imperial management as in international 
processes. 
 
International Structure: A Network Approach 
 
Our argument about the dynamics of empires is partly 
inductive, but also derives from an analysis of the network 
properties of empires. Network approaches treat structures as 
“regularities in the patterns of relations between concrete 
entities….” Every social and political environment is 
characterized by a particular network structure, one generated 
by the pattern of direct and indirect interactions between 
actors.25 As with other relational approaches in international-
relations theory, network analysis treats international 
structures as emerging from the specific interaction of agents. 
Thus, anarchy represents a particular kind of relational 
                                                 
24 On the centrality of divide-and-rule strategies for empires, 
see Mann 2003. 
25 White, Boorman et al. 1976, 733-734. 
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structure, in which states do not assert authority over the 
activities of other states.26 
In contrast, international-relations theorists often treat 
international structure as sui generis. Many variants of realist 
theory, for example, conceptualize anarchy as an ordering 
principle that stands apart from the relations of states in the 
international system.27 Even though agent-structure co-
constitution is a fundamental principle of constructivist meta-
theory,28 some constructivists understand international structure 
in terms of catalogs of norms, identities, and values that 
stand, at least analytically, above and outside of the 
interactions of agents.29 This makes it difficult to analyze 
structural variation of the kind implied by the existence of 
informal imperial relations; it also obscures how specific 
structural variation in international politics can lead to 
different combinations of processes and mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
26 Dessler 1989; Lake 1996; Lake 1999; Lake 2003; Milner 1993; 
Weber 1997. 
27 Waltz 1979. For a similar point, see Lake 2001; Lake 2003. 
28 Onuf 1989; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999. 
29 Author 
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Network Analysis 
Network analysis, whether in qualitative or quantitative 
variants, is only just beginning to make inroads into 
international-relations scholarship.30 Even in more settled 
applications of network analysis there are a variety of 
different approaches, terms, and measurement standards. In this 
article, we borrow a number of key concepts and adapt them for 
our own purpose. 
Ties are formed between at least two actors through 
processes of social interaction.  They involve any kind of 
exchange relationship, whether reciprocal, unilateral, coercive, 
affective, violent or peaceful. For example, gift exchange, 
physical coercion, economic transactions, romantic interactions, 
and military conflict are different forms of social interactions 
that produce ties.31 Strong ties are of long duration, affective 
                                                 
30 Goddard forthcoming; Heffner-Burton and Montgomery 2006 
(forthcoming). 
31 Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, 1419. See also Granovetter 1973; 
Granovetter 1983; Tilly 1978; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Wellman 
and Berkowitz 1998; White and Boorman 1976. Ties do not have to 
be between actors, per se. Many network theorists focus on 
“nodes,” which may be actors, geographical locations, routers, 
or any number of other entities. See Wellman 1983, 157. 
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intensity, and high reciprocity. Weak ties, in contrast, lack 
these characteristics.32 In much of our discussion, we will be 
particularly concerned with ties of authority: interactions in 
which actors make legitimate claims on the behavior of others.  
The arrangement of ties produces a network. Any social 
structure, whether decentralized or centralized, heterogeneous 
or homogenous, can be represented in terms of a network of ties. 
It follows that, in relational and network approaches to social 
structure, structures emerge from patterns of transaction.33 This 
view is broadly consistent with the constructivist emphasis on 
agent-structure co-constitution.34 Treating structures as 
networks is also, however, consonant with structural realism’s 
                                                 
32 Granovetter 1973, 1361. One way of conceptualizing this 
variable is the “multiplexity” of ties: “a concrete tie can 
better be visualized as multiplex, e.g., a vector quantity of 
different amounts of several components” White 1972, 9. 
33 Arquilla, Ronfeldt et al. 1999; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, 
1481; Mardsen 1990, 435-436; Tilly 1998, 399; Wellman 1983, 156-
162. distinguish “networks” from “hierarchies.” While this may 
be heuristically useful for their purposes, hierarchies are also 
networks, although ones characterized by various relations of 
super- and subordination. See Chase 1980. 
34 Dessler 1989; Wight 1999. 
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insistence that structures be cast in transposable terms.35 A 
basic assumption of network and relational sociology is that 
isomorphisms in the formal properties of networks generate 
similar causal logics and dynamics. This should be the case 
regardless of the particular historical period in which a 
network structure is found, what level of analysis it operates 
at, or the specific cultural content of the ties that make up a 
network.36 
One important structural feature of networks is how dense 
or sparse they are. A standard definition of network density is 
the “ratio of existing ties to possible ties.”37 A network is 
maximally dense when every actor is directly linked to every 
other actor. In sparse networks, most actors are linked 
indirectly to one another through a small number of other actors 
in the network. Sparse networks contain a great many “structural 
holes” (network gaps).38 Actors within various networks exhibit 
various degrees of centrality, in other words, the degree to 
which they connected to other actors in the network.39 
                                                 
35 Waltz 1986, 329. 
36 Simmel 1971, 25-26. 
37 Gould 1993, 190. 
38 Burt 1992. 
39 Wellman and Berkowitz 1998. 
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Some network theorists and relational sociologists also 
refer to categories, which is generally another term for 
identities or social roles. Combining categories and networks 
yields a catnet: “a set of individuals comprising both a 
category and a network.” Dynamics of collective mobilization 
alter depending on the particular configuration of “catness” and 
“netness.” Highly organized collective action occurs when 
categorical homogeneity and network density come together in a 
particular movement, such as a “printers union local.”40 
Prisoner’s Dilemma dynamics are most prevalent in low-cat, low-
net environments: heterogeneous identities work against trust, 
while sparse networks prevent effective monitoring of 
cooperation and defection. In high-cat, high-net environments, 
however, collective identification and dense networks of 
reciprocity greatly reduce the standard collective-action 
problem associated with the Prisoner’s Dilemma.41 The logic here 
                                                 
40 Tilly 2003, 63-64. 
41 Bearman 1993. Both high-cat, low-net and low-cat, high-net 
conditions lead to their own collective-mobilization dynamics 
and problems. In the former, the lack of ties makes identity-
based collective action difficult to coordinate and sustain. In 
the latter, the lack of common identities and interests creates 
tends to interfere with collective mobilization. In either case, 
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combines rationalist and constructivist “solutions” to the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Rationalists stress repeated interaction and 
patterns of reciprocity (netness)42 while constructivist focus on 
mechanisms of collective identification in overcoming distrust 
and fears of defection (catness).43 
 
Recasting Images of Primacy as Ideal-Typical 
Network Structures 
Each of the frameworks discussed above – unipolarity, 
hegemony, and empire – imply different network structures. In 
doing so, we can better appreciate the differences and 
similarities between them; we also gain greater analytic 
leverage over how their structural properties give rise to the 
dynamics associated with them. Accounts of unipolarity and 
hegemonic orders are a staple of international-relations 
scholarship; thus, we focus our attention far more on the 
network structure of ideal-typical empires and how that 
                                                                                                                                                             
collective action is not so much a “problem” but takes different 
forms. 
42 E.g., Axelrod and Keohane 1993. 
43 E.g,, Wendt 1994; Wendt 1996. 
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structure shapes political processes of brokerage and collective 
mobilization. 
 
Unipolarity 
Scholars interested in the dynamics of unipolar systems 
derive most of their assumptions from structural-realist theory; 
states are unitary, thinly rational actors operating in an 
anarchical environment. Because pressures for self-help promote 
similar organizational structures at the unit-level, states are 
“functionally undifferentiated.” Hence, international systems 
differ mainly with respect to the distribution of power, which 
can be unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar.44 
As Keohane and Nye argue, the realist ideal-typical 
understanding of international politics assumes that states act 
as coherent units, and that multiple channels do not “connect 
societies,” whether in the form of “interstate,” 
“transgovernmental,” or “transnational” ties.45 In other words, 
the relations between states is one of “billiard balls 
colliding” against one another.46 In network terms, ties between 
                                                 
44 Waltz 1979, 104-105. Wohlforth 1999. Layne 1993. 
45 Keohane and Nye 1989, 24-25. 
46 Zacher 1992, 60. See also Milner 1993. 
Nexon/Wright 
23 
states are sparse, ties between actors within states are 
comparative dense (see Figure 1). 
Thus, the structural-realist states-under-anarchy framework 
can be recast as a nested network structure.47 Tie between states 
are comparatively very sparse, and consist of no significant 
relations of authority.48 State identities are assumed, at least 
implicitly, to be heterogenous with respect to one another: each 
state claims to represent a different national or ethnic group.49 
 
<< Figure 1 About Here >> 
 
In contrast, states themselves are treated as having a 
high-cat, high-net structure. According to Waltz, “the division 
of labor across nations… is slight in comparison with the highly 
articulated division of labor within them. Integration draws the 
parts of a nation closer together.”50 Structural realists assume 
that domestic societies are characterized by dense 
interconnections of social, political, and economic ties. At the 
same time, the ideal-typical representation of states in 
                                                 
47 Ferguson and Mansbach 1996. 
48 Waltz 2000, 88. 
49 Lapid and Kratochwil 1996. Wendt 1996. 
50 Waltz 2000, 105. 
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structural-realist theory is one of singular, coherent units, 
i.e., of entities in which a dominant categorical identity maps 
more-or-less onto the dense network of ties contained within 
domestic society.51 
 
Hegemonic Orders 
The network structures associated with hegemonic-order 
theory are different from those implicit in descriptions of 
unipolarity. Many power-transition theorists, and some 
hegemonic-order theorists, describe such international systems 
as hierarchical rather than anarchical.52 Given a choice between 
“anarchy” and “hierarchy” as sui generis categories, that seems 
reasonable. After all, hegemonic orders cannot be described as 
simply “decentralized and anarchic.”53 Recasting unipolar systems 
in network-structural terms shows that the ideal-typical 
hegemonic order is a particular configuration of anarchy and 
hierarchy, one distinctive from that associated with unipolar 
orders. 
                                                 
51 Lapid and Kratochwil 1996. 
52 Ikenberry 2001, 26; Lemke and Werner 1996, 22; Organski 1958. 
53 Waltz 1979, 88. 
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First, the network structure of hegemonic systems involves 
the existence of at least some weak and sparse ties of authority 
between the hegemon and lesser powers. Such authority ties are 
both weak and sparse because they are (a) informal and (b) 
maintained through the selective use of punishments and 
incentives by the hegemonic power. Moreover, hegemonic-order 
theorists generally conceptualize these ties as operating 
between states themselves; in other words, their primary form is 
inter-state rather than inter-societal.54 
Hegemonic-order theorists, like structural realists, focus 
on the interests and policies of coherent states. 55 For power-
transition theorists the key question is whether rising powers 
are “revisionist” or “status-quo” states.56 This position makes 
sense if the structure of inter-state relations is broadly 
similar to the low-cat, low-net configuration also found in 
structural-realist theory. States cannot decide whether or not 
to challenge the hegemonic power through inter-state force 
unless they enjoy significant internal coherence and autonomy  
in world politics. 
                                                 
54 Gilpin 1981, 145; Ikenberry 2002, 9-10; Lemke and Werner 1996, 
22-23, 50-53. Ikenberry 2001, 27. 
55 Ikenberry 2001. 
56 Gilpin 1981; Lemke 2002, 22; Organski 1958. 
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Second, ideal-typical hegemonic orders also differ from 
ideal-typical unipolarity in that they involve higher levels of 
interdependence. Hegemonic orders, particularly if they involve 
open-trade regimes, encourage the formation of cross-cutting 
ties between states within the hegemonic system. After all, the 
ability of states to reap gains from limited economic 
specialization, or from the creation of a network of security 
guarantees, isan important component in most accounts of the 
factors that stabilize hegemonic orders.57 
 
<< Figure 2 About Here >> 
 
These two differences give rise to an ideal-typical network 
structure of the kind illustrated in Figure 2. Authority ties 
are represented by dotted arrows to capture their weak and 
sparse quality, while cross-cutting ties are represented as a 
few lines to capture their comparative sparseness.58  
A distinctive version of hegemonic orders is G. John 
Ikenberry’s notion of a “constitutional order.” Constitutional 
                                                 
57 Ikenberry 2001; Ikenberry 2002, 10. 
58 Technically, these cross-cutting ties should link all states 
together. We have avoided representing such ties to keep the 
diagram legible. 
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orders “are political orders organized around agreed-upon legal 
and political institutions that operate to allocate rights and 
limit the exercise of power.”59 When hegemons establish 
constitutional orders, they create a system in which decision-
making is highly institutionalized. Through institutional 
channels, lesser powers can, therefore, exert influence over the 
decisions of the hegemonic power. At the same time, these 
institutions diminish the political autonomy of the hegemon, 
thus allowing it to credibly commit to policies of strategic 
restraint.60 
 
<< Figure 3 about here >> 
 
These factors lead to an ideal-typical network structure 
that deviates from standard hegemonic orders (see Figure 3). 
First, institutions operate as social sites for reciprocal ties 
of authority between the hegemon and lesser powers. We represent 
these ties as bidirectional vectors of authority. Second, these 
ties connect all relevant actors within the hegemonic order. In 
other words, they are denser than those seen in traditional 
hegemonic orders and contain far fewer structural holes. Third, 
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they are formal ties, representing organizational patterns of 
authority. The ideal-typical structure of constitutional orders 
mirrors John G. Ruggie’s description of multilateralism, in 
which states within the order have voice opportunities and 
influence with respect to one another’s decisions.61 
Our ideal-typical hegemonic order does not involve 
international institutions, while our ideal-typical 
constitutional order does. Actual hegemonic orders, at least 
from 1815 onwards, combine elements of both ideal types.62 
Nevertheless, an institutionalized hegemonic order that looked 
closer to ideal-typical hegemonic orders than ideal-typical 
constitutional orders would involve authority operating from the 
hegemonic power over lesser powers through institutional sites. 
 
Empires 
The combination of heterogeneous contracting and indirect 
rule gives ideal-typical empires a particular network structure 
(see Figure 4). It involves three types of actors: core imperial 
authorities (IA) local intermediaries (L1-L4), and local actors 
(A-I). To simplify matters, we have included only two local 
actors per periphery. One should also assume a greater number of 
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peripheries than the four represented here. This network 
represents only routine authority relations. Imperial 
authorities may, for example, bypass local intermediaries and 
negotiate directly with local actors, but doing so involves a 
significant break from the normal processes of imperial rule. 
Other kinds of ties may also exist in the network (e.g., 
economic, social, and kinship), but we will exclude 
consideration of such non-institutional ties for the present. 
There are two important “levels” at which we can view the 
network-structure of empires: the aggregate structure of the 
entire network, and the local structure of core-periphery 
relations (e.g., IA, L1, A, and B).  
 
<< Figure 4 about here >> 
 
Aggregate Structure 
At the aggregate level, IA is connected to L1, L2, L3 and 
L4, and indirectly connected to A-I. In contrast, no actors 
within a periphery are directly connected to any actors in a 
different periphery. For example, L1 is not connected to L2, L3, 
and L4; L2, C, and D are connected to one another, but are not 
connected to L2-L4, or to A, B, E, F… I. Thus, ties between 
peripheries are comparatively weak and sparse, ties within 
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peripheries are comparatively strong and dense. This aggregate 
structure gives rise to a number of significant, though 
interdependent, network characteristics. 
The first involves centrality and brokerage. Both in terms 
of the hierarchy of authority within empires, and in terms of 
patterns of ties, core imperial authorities occupy a central 
position with respect to the overall network. In some respects, 
this is just another way of saying that empires have a core-
periphery structure, but it has important implications.  
In network analysis centrality is often a proxy for power 
and influence. The underlying mechanism involves informational 
asymmetries: actors with more connections have more information 
about the preferences and orientations of others than those with 
fewer connections.63 In imperial structures, core authorities 
occupy a brokerage position between local intermediaries and 
aggregate peripheries: they negotiate relations between 
different peripheries, giving them a substantial advantage in 
terms of power and influence vis-à-vis actors in the rest of the 
network. The fact that these networks involve authoritative 
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relations of super- and subordination only reinforces those 
other structural sources of asymmetric power. 
The second involves peripheral segmentation and collective 
mobilization. Figure 1 does not adequately capture one important 
consequence of heterogeneous contracting: the ties that run from 
IA through L1-L4 to local actors in each periphery all represent 
a different combination of rights, rules, and obligations. In 
other words, the categorical identity inhering in the 
relationship between IA and each periphery is different. This 
tends to prevent a concordance of interests between peripheries.  
Moreover, the organization of empires involves structural 
holes between peripheries, i.e., the comparatively sparse and 
weak inter-periphery ties discussed above. Peripheries are 
disconnected or segmented from one another, at least with 
respect to authoritative or institutional ties. These structural 
holes work against cross-periphery coordination and collective 
mobilization; they create and reinforce low-cat, low-net inter-
periphery relations. Since actors in each periphery are isolated 
from one another, peripheries will (all things being equal) tend 
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towards greater institutional, attitudinal, and normative 
differentiation over time.64 
 
Local Structure 
If we look at the local structure of imperial relations we 
see a rather different picture. In the relationship between core 
imperial authorities and any given periphery, local 
intermediaries display a higher degree of network centrality. 
L4, for example, is directly connected to IA, H, and I. I is 
directly connected to H and L4, H to I and L4, and IA only to 
L4. Thus, local intermediaries occupy the key brokerage position 
in the relationship between imperial cores and their 
peripheries. In terms of local relationships, they are more 
powerful than central authorities, although that power will, in 
some respects, be undermined by their lack of authority over 
imperial central authorities. 
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Imperial Dynamics 
The structure of transactions and the distribution of 
identities in empires helps account for the four major dynamics 
discussed previously: the workings of across-segment divide and 
rule, the dangers posed by cross pressures and how they shape 
legitimating strategies, the tradeoffs of intermediary autonomy, 
the use of within-segment divide and rule to prevent the 
formation of local coalitions against imperial control, and how 
these factors  may concatenate into imperial overextension. We 
consider each of these in turn. 
 
Aggregate Structure: Across-Segment Divide and Rule 
A key difference between realist conceptions of 
international structure and those found in imperial relations is 
that the former stress the centrality of the balance-of-power 
mechanism while the latter involve recurrent logics of divide 
and rule. In balance-of-power theory, actors seek to form 
countervailing coalitions against rising powers. The stability 
of unipolarity, in turn, depends largely on the ability and 
willingness of states- or lack thereof- to challenge the 
dominant power. Divide-and-rule strategies, in contrast, aim to 
prevent the formation of countervailing coalitions by exploiting 
divisions between potential challengers. Divide and rule, 
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therefore, is a means of maintaining hierarchy, while the 
balance of power works to maintain anarchical relations. 
Similarly, divide-and-conquer strategies aim to establish 
hierarchy by disrupting the balance-of-power mechanism. Divide-
and-conquer strategies follow broadly similar logics to those 
found in divide and rule.65 
Why are processes of divide and rule central to the 
workings of empires? In empires, core imperial authorities 
control subordinated political communities; that control is 
institutionalized through asymmetric bargains. Thus, there is 
always a risk that actors within a periphery will find the 
imperial bargain unacceptable. At a minimum, they may seek to 
renegotiate the bargain on more favorable terms. At a maximum, 
they may seek to secede from the imperial arrangement. Even when 
the aim of peripheral actors is to renegotiate the terms of the 
bargain, they often seek to do so through a display of force. In 
any event, core imperial authorities need to be able to draw 
upon superior resources to those available to potential 
challengers in the periphery. 
One way that empires do so is by acquiring and maintaining 
technological, military, and social-organizational advantages 
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over subordinated states. Another source of asymmetric power, 
though, is that core imperial authorities enjoy access to 
resources from throughout the empire, in other words, from the 
various peripheries connected to the core. Thus, in principle, 
they can meet resistance in one periphery with capabilities 
drawn from the rest of the imperial network.66 
The network characteristics of empires play an important 
role in enhancing the position of imperial cores vis-à-vis 
peripheral segments. First, because heterogeneous contracting 
makes every imperial bargain unique, disputes between core 
imperial authorities and local actors over the terms of a 
bargain tend not to spill over into other peripheries.67 Second, 
the existence of structural holes between peripheries creates, 
in essence, “firewalls” against the spread of resistance: the 
absence of cross-cutting ties and sources of collective 
identification across peripheries makes it very difficult for 
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force” and foreign wars, see Cohen 2004; Luttwak 1976; Rosen 
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67 However, it is also the case that actors may view bargains 
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actors in one periphery to collectively mobilize against 
imperial rule. In sum, resistance to imperial rule is less 
likely to spread and rebels are less likely to coordinate or 
collaborate. Core imperial authorities are therefore able to 
bring overwhelming force against an isolated rebellion or 
uncoordinated uprising. 
We can observe these dynamics in numerous different cases. 
The Soviet Union put down the Hungarian uprising in 1956 without 
facing uprisings in other Warsaw Pact countries. In 1967 it 
intervened in Czechoslovakia to remove an intermediary whose 
liberalizing policies they perceived as destabilizing for the 
imperium, and did so with the help of other Warsaw Pact 
nations.68 The existence of structural holes between peripheries 
helped contain rebellions in the Roman Empire, allowing the 
Romans to use concentrated force against uprisings.69 Indeed, 
peripheral segmentation can even undermine simultaneous 
rebellions by discouraging cooperation. Between 1519 and 1522, 
Charles of Habsburg faced two rebellions in his Iberian domains. 
The revolt of the Comuneros in Castile (1520-1521) and of the 
Hermanias in Valencia (1519-1522), one of the constituent 
principalities of Aragon-Catalonia. Neither set of rebels made 
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any attempt to communicate with one another or to coordinate 
their uprisings. They each saw their concerns as local matters, 
concerning customary rights, privileges, and factional disputes. 
Each, in turn, was defeated separately by forces loyal to 
Charles.70 
 
Factors that Undermine Across-Periphery Divide and Rule 
What kinds of developments undermine imperial divide and 
rule? The first involve decreasing peripheral segmentation. 
Increasing inter-periphery catness and netness expand the 
opportunities and potential motives for collective resistance to 
imperial rule. The second involve exogenous and endogenous 
triggers for simultaneous resistance, such as particular 
policies adopted by core imperial elites or exogenous shocks 
that lead to independent, but simultaneous, uprisings in 
multiple peripheries.  
Decreasing peripheral segmentation. Empires often, either 
deliberately or inadvertently, encourage connections between 
peripheries. For example, imperial rule often facilitates the 
growth of inter-periphery trade, which brings with it increasing 
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ties between actors in the periphery.71 The diffusion of imperial 
culture can also build cross-cutting ties. The Romans and 
various Chinese dynasties created large zones of cultural 
commonality and interaction within their domains.72 The Japanese 
engaged in varying degrees of “assimilative practices” within 
their empire, often aiming (with mixed success) to build 
emotional ties between colonial subjects and the symbols of the 
Japanese empire.73 Such developments correlate with the 
diminished salience of divide and rule. As Motyl argues, 
“Because Britain’s American colonies had developed extensive 
economic and political linkages long before 1776, they could 
mount organized opposition to His Majesty’s imposition of 
various taxes and successfully rebel.”74 
The emergence of inter-periphery “transnational” movements 
also create cross-cutting ties across peripheries, as well as 
sometimes providing common categorical identities among actors 
in different peripheries. Prior to the Reformation coordinated 
cross-periphery resistance was a relatively rare event in early 
modern Europe. The pattern found in the Coumeros and Hermanias 
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rebellions was a typical feature of resistance in France, the 
Low Countries, and elsewhere.75 The Reformation, however, led to 
the  formation of relatively high-cat, high-net movements: it 
created transnational and trans-regional religions networks and 
identities that formed a basis for collective mobilization 
against – and sometimes, in support of – central authorities. 
The political crises of the Dutch Revolt and the French Wars of 
Religion were extremely destabilizing to their respective 
monarchies, in part, because members of the Reformed faith in 
both countries (as well as ultra-Catholics in France) drew 
strength and coordinated action across regions that were 
normally fragmented by different interests and identities.76 
Such patterns need not involve dense ties between actors. 
The existence of common religious categorical identities across 
Empires is often a sufficient basis for simultaneous resistance. 
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The British were very aware of this potential problem for their 
empire; they often shaped their policies towards the Ottoman 
Empire with an eye to how those policies would be received by 
their Muslim subjects. The Ottoman’s themselves attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to encourage a jihad against the British in 
Egypt.77 
Triggers of simultaneous resistance. These are a variety of 
exogenous and relatively autonomous developments that may 
undermine imperial divide and rule. Any shock, such as 
widespread famines or economic downturns, which provokes unrest 
in multiple segments might lead to across-segment resistance to 
imperial rule. Similarly, ideological forces and social 
movements can create simultaneous resistance to imperial rule in 
multiple segments even if they do not create cross-cutting ties 
or common identities. A good example of this kind of process is 
the role of the rise of nationalism in the unraveling of the 
European colonial empires. The diffusion of ideas of national 
self-determination to local elites and subjects led to multiple 
movements against colonial rule in the imperial territories of 
Britain, France, and the Netherlands. The rise of nationalist 
movements in so many different peripheries certainly undermined 
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the ability of the European colonial empires to maintain control 
over their extensive territories.78 
Core imperial authorities may promulgate policies that lead 
to resistance in multiple peripheries at the same time. In some 
cases, a confluence of imperial attempts to extract more 
resources from different peripheries may trigger simultaneous 
rebellions. In other cases, core imperial authorities may 
attempt to impose uniform bargains across a number of 
peripheries. In such instances, they do away with the divide-
and-rule advantages of heterogeneous bargaining. For example, 
towards the end of the Thirty Years’ War, the Count-Duke 
Olivares’ proposed a “Union of Arms” which would have abrogated 
traditional privileges in the constituent realms of the Spanish 
Habsburg monarchy by subjecting them to the more ‘absolutist’ 
form of rule found in Castile. The proposal prompted rebellions 
in both Portugal and Catalonia, and created the conditions for 
uprisings in Naples and Palermo; although the rebels did not 
actively collaborate, the Spanish Habsburgs could not 
effectively suppress all of the rebellions. Portugal achieved 
independence, and the uprisings titled the balance against the 
Habsburgs in their war with France and its allies.79 
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Aggregate Structure: Cross Pressures 
Occupying a brokerage position at the center of a highly 
segmented network facilitates divide-and-rule strategies, but it 
also subjects actors to powerful cross pressures. As we have 
argued, the combination of heterogeneous contracting and 
peripheral segmentation reinforces, and sometimes creates, 
distinctive identities and interests. Thus, central imperial 
authorities are forced to navigate between different “pushes and 
pulls” as actors in peripheries attempt to shape imperial policy 
in favorable ways. In particular, when empires seek to 
expropriate revenue and manpower to fight conflicts in the 
interest of specific peripheries they may face stiff resistance 
from segments that have no stake in those conflicts.  
For instance, most politically significant actors in the 
Low Countries saw little reason to contribute resources to the 
Spanish war effort when that effort involved security against 
the Turks in Germany and the Mediterranean.80 The British 
experienced the dangers associated with cross pressures in the 
eighteenth century when they adopted policies designed to aid 
the East India Company. As H.V. Bowen notes, “Parliamentary 
action had been designed to enable the hard-pressed East India 
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Company to dispose of its large accumulated stocks of tea in 
London, but in the ports of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia 
the measure was interpreted as a calculated attempt to force 
cheap but highly taxed tea onto colonial consumers.”81 Negative 
propaganda against the East India Company generated a widespread 
perception that “Powerful Eastern influences emanating from one 
periphery of Britain’s overseas empire were thus seen to have 
weakened the imperial core and it appeared that, in turn, they 
were now being brought to bear upon another periphery.”82 
Although heterogeneous contracting tends to isolate each 
imperial bargain, the last example demonstrates how poorly 
managed cross pressures can effectively link different 
peripheral bargains. When a core engages in strategies 
associated with “credible commitments” towards one periphery, it 
may convince actors in other peripheries that their interests 
are being “sold out.”83 This is most likely under conditions of 
mounting cross pressures, since actors in a given periphery 
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already tend to be concerned – as they were in British North 
America – about a core’s favoritism towards another periphery. 
Thus, the more segmented empires are, the easier across-
segment divide and rule is, but the more intense cross pressures 
become. Central authorities may attempt to limit the impact of 
cross pressures through the judicious use of side payments or 
other incentives to actors within different segments. The 
problem with this approach is that it often accumulates 
obligations while draining imperial resources. Every time core 
imperial authorities renegotiate a core-periphery bargain on 
terms favorable to the periphery they reduce their access to 
revenue and resources. 
Moreover, such strategies may, over time, worsen relations 
between imperial authorities and peripheral segments. As in the 
case of British North America, actors in a periphery may come to 
believe they are getting a comparatively poor deal with respect 
to other segments of the empire. Empires can also ignore demands 
coming from the periphery and bank on their ability to localize 
and suppress resistance, but doing so also increases the risks 
of resistance in an ever expanding number of peripheries. 
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Multivocal Signaling 
One way of minimizing cross pressures is through 
legitimating strategies that are multivocal or polyvalent: that 
signal different identities and values to different audiences. 
The idea here is to get heterogeneous audiences to attribute 
shared identities and values to imperial authorities. Because 
agents invariably are more willing to accommodate, sacrifice 
for, and support those they see as members of an in-group, 
mutivocal legitimation strategies expand the “win-set” of 
imperial authorities in dealing with different peripheries and 
make resistance to their demands less likely.84 
This is one of the crucial insights in John F. Padgett’s 
and Christopher F. Ansell’s seminal work on network structures 
and multivocal signaling. Cosimo de’ Medici occupied a central 
location in the segmented network structure of elite interaction 
in Florence. The Medici family spanned the structural holes in 
Florentine elite interaction; Cosimo was able to exploit his 
resulting informational and resource advantages by engaging in 
“robust action,” i.e., “multivocal action leads to Rorscach blot 
identities, with all alters constructing their own distinctive 
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attribution of the identity of ego.” Multivocal signaling is 
most effective when the two audiences either cannot or do not 
communicate with one another. If they do compare notes, they may 
demand clarification from the signaler.85 
In the context of imperial dynamics, mutlivocality enables 
central authorities to engage in divide-and-conquer tactics 
without permanently alienating other political sites and thus 
eroding the continued viability of such strategies. To the 
“extent that local social relations and the demands of 
standardizing authorities contradict each other, polyvalent [or 
multivocal] performance becomes a valuable means of mediating 
between them” since actions can be “coded differently within the 
audiences.”86 On the other hand, during moments of political 
resistance, opponents of central authorities also have to hold 
together diverse coalitions if they wish to counteract divide-
and-conquer strategies. Multivocal signaling provides a crucial 
means of preventing the splintering of any cobbled-together 
political coalition.  
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These dynamics provide additional reasons why Reformation 
led to a breakdown in the European political order. We have 
discussed how the Reformation created transnational networks 
that bridged the segmented structure of early modern states. It 
also, however, made it difficult for dynasts to engage in 
multivocal signaling. One could not easily be both a Protestant 
and a Catholic, an advocate of reformation or counter-
reformation, at the same time.87 
Legitimacy, as we have already suggested, plays an 
important role in imperial management. As a form of hierarchical 
organization, empires need to convince significant actors that 
the benefits of continued imperial rule outweigh the costs of 
domination. To the extent that they can legitimate that 
domination, they make resistance less likely and thereby secure 
continued imperial control. It follows from our discussion of 
cross pressures, however, that not all strategies of imperial 
legitimation are equal. Multivocal signaling, in particular, can 
help offset the dangers associated with cross pressures and 
therefore minimize the tradeoffs created by peripheral 
segmentation. 
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Local Structure: Intermediary Autonomy 
Indirect rule minimizes the governance costs of rule.88 
Empire “has proved to be a recurrent, flexible form of large-
scale rule for two closely related reasons: because it holds 
together disparate smaller-scale units without requiring much 
centrally-controlled internal transformation, and because it 
pumps resources to rulers without costly monitoring and 
repression.”89 As long as intermediaries are left to tailor rule-
making and enforcement to local conditions, core imperial 
authorities can avoid the various costs that come with direct 
entanglement in peripheral governance. 
In fact, the imposition of direct rule can be particularly 
‘costly’ when it turns central authorities into intimate 
participants in local factional and political struggles, thereby 
eroding their ability to function—in pretense if not in fact—as 
‘impartial’ brokers in such conflicts. On the other hand, when 
intermediaries assume the costs of participating in local 
factional politics central authorities are able to maintain some 
degree of plausible deniability. If intermediaries make and 
enforce unpopular or politically disruptive policies – even when 
those policies are approved by central authorities – central 
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authorities can triangulate between intermediaries and their 
subjects. 
Niccòlo Machiavelli describes a rather extreme version of 
this kind of triangulation strategy. After conquering the 
Romagna, Cesare Borge put Remiro d’Orco in charge of 
restructuring the province and bringing order to it. But, since 
“he knew the harsh measures of the past had given rise to some 
enmity towards him,” the duke decided to make clear that d’Orco, 
not he, was responsible. Thus, “one morning, in the town square 
of Cesena,” Cesare Borge, “had Remiro d’Orco’s corpse laid out 
in two pieces, with a chopping board and a bloody knife beside 
it.90 
The manipulation of intermediary autonomy to create 
plausible deniability is often far less dramatic. The Spanish 
routinely let governors and viceroys take the blame for 
unpopular policies, but usually merely sacked their 
intermediaries when imperial demands triggered too much 
resistance.91  
There are two main downsides to indirect rule. First, it 
can be rather inefficient. The more indirect imperial 
administration, the more room for licit and illicit diversion of 
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resources into the hands of intermediaries. Indirect rule also 
decreases the efficiency of response to imperial directives; as 
in all principal-agent relations, the less imperial authorities 
monitor and enforce compliance with policies, the more room they 
create for subversion of those policies.92 
Second, because intermediaries occupy a position of 
relative centrality vis-à-vis the core and a particular 
periphery, they may gain asymmetric leverage over the relations 
between core imperial authorities and imperial subjects. If they 
use this leverage to pursue their own interests in power and 
wealth, they may not merely subvert particular policies but 
decide to break away from imperial control. Such cases were 
endemic during periods of the Roman Empire (unified, western, 
and eastern); indeed, military leaders, governors, and local 
rulers did not only set themselves up as autonomous local 
rulers, but often sought to claim the imperial title for 
themselves.93 
The archetypal case of such “patrimonial secessions” is, 
perhaps, Muhammad Ali Pasha’s uprising against the Ottoman 
Empire. Appointed governor of Egypt in 1805, he immediately 
consolidated his personal power by massacring the extant Mamluk 
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elite. From there he set about to substitute his own empire for 
that of the Ottomans. Ultimately, only foreign intervention 
prevented his dismemberment of much of the Ottoman Empire.94 
Empires can deal with these tradeoffs in a variety of ways. 
Various Chinese dynasties, for example, rotated imperial 
administrators to prevent them from developing strong (and 
independent) ties with actors in a particular segment.95 However, 
any attempt to manage these tradeoffs involves finding an 
acceptable compromise between them. There is no “magic bullet” 
for navigating the costs and benefits of intermediary autonomy. 
 
Local Structure: Within-Segment Divide and Rule 
Imperial strategies to maintain effective rule within 
segments aim to prevent the formation of extensive coalitions 
against their revenue, resource, and political demands. In 
keeping with our simplified model of imperial actors, within-
segment divide and rule involves four classes of actors: central 
authorities, local intermediaries, and two groups of local 
actors. All things being equal, the fewer the number of 
significant sites (actors and groups of actors) that resist 
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imperial rule at any given time, the easier it is for empires to 
maintain control over a periphery. 
Within-segment divide and rule takes a number of different 
forms. In binding strategies, empires develop a class of local 
actors – often local elites who themselves may act as 
intermediaries – whose status, material position, or ideological 
orientations tie them closely to central authorities. This is 
the strategy Charles V ultimately opted for in Castile when he 
threw his support and patronage behind the great nobles in order 
to crush the Comuneros revolt. Imperial authorities have pursued 
these binding strategies in a number of ways: by making hostages 
of the children of local elites (with the aim of both control 
those elites and socializing their successors into the customs 
and mores of the empire), by providing various forms of side 
payments to a particular local group, and otherwise making 
segments of the local population dependent upon imperial rule.96 
Regardless, the aim is to create relatively strong and dense 
ties with some subset of significant local actors. These actors, 
whether they act as local intermediaries or as adjutants to 
imperial rule, are thus (the imperial authorities hope) removed 
as a potential site of resistance. 
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In pivoting strategies, central authorities maintain the 
ability to triangulate between different local factions, and 
even their own intermediaries. Pivoting is more difficult to 
implement, but potentially more effective because it prevents 
imperial rule from itself becoming dependent on the goodwill of 
a single local group. This kind of “playing off” of local groups 
against one another is chronicled, for instance, by Hendrik 
Spruyt in his account of the early consolidation of the Capetian 
monarchy in France.97 Although not precisely parallel in nature, 
this is the kind of policy the Jurchen used to prevent the 
emergence of a threat to their rule from the Mongolian steppe. 
The strategy worked well until the Jurchen’s miscalculations 
facilitated the rise of Chinggis Khan.98 The British, for their 
part, made extensive use of such within-segment divide-and-rule 
strategies.99 
Because of the absence of institutional firewalls generated 
by an empire’s rimless hub-and-spoke structure, within-segment 
divide and rule is inherently more difficult than across-segment 
divide and rule. Thus within-segment divide and rule depends 
upon exploiting categorical differences: class, status, 
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identity, religion, ethnicity, and so forth.100 For example, 
Mahmood Mamdami argues that indirect rule in British Africa 
permanently reconstructed social relations by empowering and 
disempowering different local actors.101 The Belgians relied on 
the Tutsi minority to maintain control over Rwanda-Burundi.102 
This is one major reason why binding strategies are easier to 
implement than pivoting strategies: it is less difficult to rely 
on a particular group to enforce imperial commands than to 
repeatedly shift commitments between categorically distinctive 
groups without, in turn, undermining the credibility of imperial 
bargains. 
The drawbacks of binding strategies are equally 
straightforward. By turning one class of local actors into, in 
effect, local intermediaries, binding can increase their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the empire. In other words, it can 
reciprocally enhance the dependency of core imperial authorities 
upon local elites. Imperial authorities, therefore, lose some of 
the flexibility and autonomy associated with pivoting 
                                                 
100 On manipulating or generating categorical stratification as 
an aspect of divide and rule, see Baumgartner, Buckley et al. 
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strategies. In general, this tends to increase aggregate-level 
cross pressures, since imperial authorities cannot respond to 
the claims of one class of local elites by credibly threatening 
to switch their support to another set of local actors. The 
Habsburgs’ dependency upon Castilian notables after the 
Comuneros revolt, for example, led them to focus their 
extractive policies on the middle classes – a focus that 
ultimately destroyed Castile’s economy.103 Finally, although 
binding strategies tend to produce a loyal subgroup of subjects, 
they also risk creating a class of permanently disenchanted 
local have-nots. 
Empires often combine aspects of these strategies: they 
attempting to make elites and non-elites socially, politically, 
and culturally tied to the center while manipulating fault lines 
between local populations. Although this represents an extremely 
effective means of maintaining control over a segment, it can be 
very difficult to implement because of the tradeoffs discussed 
above. 
 
Rethinking Overextension 
International-relations scholars tend to treat imperial 
overextension as a consequence of balance-of-power dynamics or 
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of a variety of “myths” generated by core domestic political 
calculations.104 This tendency can also be found in literature on 
the risks of American overextension.105 But implicit in much of 
this work is the recognition that overextension stems from the 
accumulation of peripheral interests by imperial cores and/or 
failures of imperial management within peripheries.  
As Paul MacDonald argues, imperial expansion is often “more 
the result of pressures in the periphery that lead to 
unintended, unanticipated political developments that generate  
reactions that pull great powers more deeply into the politics 
of other polities.”106 For example, this was one of the dilemmas 
the British faced throughout the eighteenth century vis-à-vis 
the North American colonies: the interests of their colonists 
pulled them into struggles on the North American continent that, 
from a strategic perspective, were genuinely peripheral. When 
the British government demanded, after the Seven Years War, that 
their colonist pay part of the costs of these struggles, they 
set in motion events leading to the American Revolution.107 
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Overextension is also often a consequence of local failures 
of imperial management, rather than simply a result of “foreign 
policy” dynamics. For instance, the Spanish Habsburgs’ wars with 
England (which scholars often cite as a key factor in Spanish 
overextension) were a byproduct of a peripheral uprising in the 
Netherlands. Both Philip II and Philip III hoped that, by either 
conquering England or forcing it to capitulate to Spanish 
hegemonic control, they could cut off England’s strategic 
support for the Dutch.108 
However peripheral entanglements, failures of local 
imperial management, and external warfare combine, all are often 
present in the process of imperial overextension and decline. In 
this respect, predominant international-relations accounts of 
overextension are incomplete rather than incorrect; the problem 
is when they divert our attention from dynamics driven by the 
internal structure of empires. 
 
Consequences of Variation Between the Ideal 
Types 
The systems we have discussed are ideal-typical. Real 
international systems involve particular configurations of 
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aspects of these ideal types; even in extreme cases, a 
particular international system will only approximate 
unipolarity, hegemony, or empire. Representing these ideal types 
in network-structural terms grants additional analytical 
leverage to scholars. We can explore variation in particular 
transactional patterns to see how they reflect different aspects 
of the various ideal types. By using the various ideal types as 
benchmarks we can generate insights into what dynamics, or mix 
of dynamics, will predominate in any particular set of 
interstate interactions. 
One of the key differences between imperial, hegemonic, and 
unipolar orders is the strength and density of dominance ties 
between preeminent polities and subordinate polities, i.e., the 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by actors occupying a leadership 
position in the latter (see Figure 5). This generates a 
continuum of “zones,” ranging from full autonomy (unipolarity), 
to no autonomy (an ideal-typical nation-state). Hegemonic and 
imperial orders fall in between, with “informal empire” 
constituting an ambiguous area between hegemonies and empires. 
 
<< Figure 5 about here>> 
 
This helps clarify the debate over hegemony and empire. 
Niall Ferguson argues that “the very concept of ‘hegemony’ is 
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really just a way to avoid talking about empire, ‘empire’ being 
a word to which most Americans remain averse.”109 We have already 
seen that, in ideal-typical terms, empires and hegemonies are 
different structural forms, but that non-constitutional 
hegemonic orders and empires share many network-structural 
characteristics.  
Using this kind of analysis, and assuming the truth of 
claims about unipolar and hegemonic systems, we should expect a 
number of changes as transactional patterns move between those 
described in each of the ideal types. 
 
First, as the strength and density of ties between 
preeminent powers and local rulers decreases  we should see 
three changes: (a) divide-and-rule dynamics will become less 
significant vis-à-vis balance-of-power processes, (b) principal-
agent problems will increase, and (c) within-segment divide-and-
rule will become less important for the stability of the order. 
The more autonomous local rulers are within this range, the more 
they are able to conduct independent foreign policies and thus 
engage in balancing behavior. Classic hegemonic orders, for 
example, should display a mixture of across-segment divide-and-
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rule and balance-of-power dynamics.110  Indeed, hegemonic orders 
can be thought of as either extremely weak empires or unipolar 
systems with some imperial properties (consider their location 
on the continuum in Figure 5). Regardless, decreasing network 
strength and density between preeminent powers and local rulers 
will diminish the ability of the former to ensure that their 
policy directives are followed by the latter; it will also make 
the relationship more “inter-state” and less “inter-societal.” 
Second, both increasing network connectivity and 
categorical homogeneity between lesser powers diminishes the 
efficacy of preeminent power divide-and-rule strategies. We have 
already outlined this logic in the section on across-segment 
divide and rule, but it has interesting implications. For one, 
constitutional orders create cross-cutting ties between lesser 
powers, and therefore the more a system incorporates 
“constitutional” elements the less a preeminent power will be 
able to implement divide-and-rule strategies. For another, 
various aspects of globalization – particularly the growth of 
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economic interdependence and transnational movements – should 
make across-segment divide-and-rule more difficult.  
Third, the intensity of cross pressures and the importance 
of multivocal signaling should diminish as either (a) network 
connectivity and categorical homogeneity between lesser powers 
increases or (b) as ties between the preeminent power and lesser 
powers decrease.  In ideal-typical unipolar systems, there are 
no significant ties between any of the actors. The preeminent 
power does not occupy a brokerage position, ergo, it will not 
experience intense cross pressures and multivocal legitimation 
will not be a significant strategy of control.  On the other 
hand, constitutional orders involve reciprocal authority ties 
between all relevant units; thus, the preeminent power’s 
structural position is less one of a brokerage and more one of 
joint participation in generalized decision making. These 
conditions not only minimize cross pressures but tend to 
displace them across the network. 
Fourth, as contracting becomes more uniform, the intensity 
of cross pressures and the importance of multivocal signaling 
will decrease. This is the inverse of the logic put forth in the 
discussion of heterogeneous contracting. It suggests another way 
in which constitutional orders are less subject to imperial 
dynamics, and thus another source of salient structural 
variation in international politics. Indeed, when great powers 
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opt for multiple bilateral ties over multilateral arrangements, 
they capture some of the costs and benefits associated with 
imperial rule. There is evidence that policy makers, at least 
implicitly, recognize these tradeoffs. Recent research suggests 
that the US opted for a hub-and-spoke alliance system, rather 
than a North Atlantic Treaty Organization-style multilateral 
system, in East Asia, at least in part, in order to facilitate 
divide-and-rule strategies, i.e., to avoid collusion between 
“local intermediaries” such as Chiang Kai-shek of Formosa and 
Syngman Rhee of South Korea.111 
 
These claims are, of course, derived from ideal-typical 
analysis. Substantiating them requires further investigation 
into specific cases. Any given system may involve a variety of 
transactional patterns reflecting various aspects of these ideal 
types. A particular preeminent power may itself have relations 
that, vis-à-vis different states or in even in some policy 
arenas, reflect different network configurations. What our 
analysis of ideal-typical empires, and our discussion of 
variation between different kinds of systems with preeminent 
powers suggests, is that analysts should not presuppose that a 
system fits one particular type and then use that type to derive 
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lessons for grand strategy. Instead, we should inquire more 
deeply into how variation in the structure of relations leads to 
different embedded dynamics in international politics, with more 
complicated consequences for the development and implementation 
of grand strategy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Is the United States an empire? This paper does not seek to 
answer that question, but to suggest that we should be asking a 
different one: to what extent, and with whom, does the structure 
of relations between the United States and other political 
communities resemble those found in ideal-typical empires? The 
American relationship with Iraq undoubtedly has many of the 
structural characteristics we associate with empires,112 but the 
picture is far more mixed when we consider other Middle Eastern 
states, such as Egypt and Israel, let alone European and East 
Asian polities.113 Rather than engage in detailed empirical 
assessments of American foreign relations here, we close by 
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suggesting a number of implications that follow from our 
analysis. 
To the extent that American international relations have an 
imperial structure, current debates about the existence or non-
existence of balancing represent a misdirected focus. In 
imperial systems, the problem is not counterbalancing, but 
instead the effectiveness of imperial strategies of divide and 
rule; if we observe widespread counterbalancing, then an 
informal imperial system is already passing away. Similarly, the 
problem of “anti-Americanism” takes on new dimensions. Since the 
stability of empires depends, in no small measure, on the 
continuing legitimacy of imperial bargains, growing hostility 
towards imperial cores represents a demonstrable threat to 
imperial order. It may also be the case that some of the 
problems in American-Middle East relations are tired to cross 
pressures: consider the difficulties created by close American 
ties to Israel for its relations with Arab publics in Egypt, 
Jordan, and elsewhere.114 
If there are embedded imperial relations in the current 
international system, it also follows that our traditional 
concern with inter-state relations is likely to distract us from 
many of the dynamics most important to the stability of the 
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current order, i.e., what we have called the “within segment” 
and “across segment” processes involving local intermediaries 
and local actors.115 Our analysis suggests, for example, that 
transnational movements – whether in the form of militant Islam 
or more peaceful forms of transnational activism – should become 
relevant to the kinds of power-political concerns traditionally 
addressed in realist theory. 
Finally,  any “American empire” faces a basic problem. 
Current processes of globalization, such as enhanced inter-
societal communications and other channels of interdependence, 
are both a source of stability and instability for the putative 
“American imperial order.” On the one hand, they represent part 
of the “bargain” the United States has offered to other 
political communities in exchange for the toleration of American 
primacy. On the other hand, by enhancing inter-segment 
connectivity they undermine imperial rule. It is potentially 
ironic, therefore, that just as attention to the possibility of 
American empire is reaching new heights, the basic conditions of 
possibility for American empire may themselves be eroding. 
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Figure 1: Unipolarity 
 
 
Figure 2: Hegemony 
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Figure 3: Constitutional Order 
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Figure 5: Intermediary Autonomy and International Orders 
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